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1 Introduction 
 
The issue of corporate governance has always been 
interesting for business economics. Several reasons 
have led scholars to address the above issue. In 
particular, in the context of management studies, 
corporate governance may prove to be an important 
determinant of various aspects of business dynamics. 
Such aspects can reconnect, for example, to the 
performance, to the default risk and, nevertheless, to 
the probability of the future survival of the company. 
Riskier financial conditions can be determined, in 
fact, both by inefficient internal dynamics and by 
general hostile economic conditions (Whitaker, 1999). 
In this context, the current economic and financial 
crisis has made companies more vulnerable and more 
exposed to situations of insolvency. The interest 
towards the relationship between corporate 
governance issues, performance and conditions of 
financial distress is emphasized also by recent cases 
of corporate governance failure, such as the scandal of 
Parmalat (Melis, 2005). In particular, this study 
focused on the mentioned issue researching some 
possible relationships between the main determinants 
of the corporate governance of the sampled 
companies, some performance and default risk 
indicators. 
For this purpose, we proposed a synthetic 
indicator (good Governance Index-gGI) capable of 
providing a measure of the quality of corporate 
governance for companies listed on the Italian Stock 
Exchange (MTA segment) in 2005-2011, excluding 
pure financial companies and real estate services 
companies (Giovannini, 2010; Sraer and Tesmar, 
2006; Favero et al., 2006). A more accurate analysis 
of the impact of governance systems, on one side, and 
performance and risk, on the other, has been 
conducted looking at the relationships between some 
of the parameters used to build the synthetic indicator 
and some performance and risk measures. The 
analysis reveals that some key factors of the 
governance profile – such as the existence of 
shareholders’ agreements, of a Code of Ethics and the 
presence of non-executive directors –  can positively 
bind with certain performance and business value 
measures. In particular, the performances were 
observed focusing on their accounting profile (ROI), 
on their market trends (CAR) and on the evaluation of 
the company’s ability to create value (Tobin-Q). The 
financial risk, however, was measured looking at the 
level of indebtedness (Leverage), and at the Z-Score 
indicator, developed to classify the sampled firms into 
financially distressed and non-distressed groups 
(Altman, 1968). 
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In these years, the discussion is lively on what 
may be the best strategies to create value and to 
“react” to the crisis (Wan and Yiu, 2009; Cartwright 
and Schoenberg, 2006). Entrepreneurs and policy 
makers are debating on the real contribution that 
merger and acquisitions can play on the value creation 
process (Bigelli and Mengoli, 1999) and on the 
different factors of attractiveness that a market in 
recession can present, including the opportunity to 
deal underestimated targets (Granata and Chirico, 
2010). Analyses that involve the observation of the 
economic system in general, but particularly in Italy, 
also cannot leave aside the study of family business 
that represents an essential component of the Italian 
economic structure. The family business is an 
“evergreen” research field concerning for example the 
definition of the “familiness”, the relationships 
between the “familiness” and the performances, the 
implemented strategies and some other issues. One of 
the topic moving the debate among scholars regards 
its possible dynamics of growth of family firms. In 
this sense, our analysis is based on the evidence 
stemming from a sample of the Milan Stock 
Exchange listed companies which made acquisitions 
in the considered period.  
In order to deepen the investigation and to better 
understand if the particular nature of the companies, 
or their capacity to pursue external growth strategies, 
could affect the above mentioned relationships, we 
analyzed the sampled companies distinguishing them 
on the basis of their “familiness” (Rutherford et al., 
2008) and of their propensity towards the realization 
of active acquisitions. In this regard, we tried to verify 
the difference of effects of Corporate Governance 
variables on performance and risk for family 
businesses and for companies involved in active 
M&A deals. 
Our major finding is that companies could 
improve their Corporate Governance quality, 
especially in the subsample of family business: they 
detected a lower value of the good governance index, 
although the index value could be influenced by some 
specific drivers connected to the “familiness” (i.e. 
Executive Independent, CEO). Moreover, we should 
point out that the non-family companies are better 
structured, demonstrating a greater protection of 
minorities and opening to the outside. 
We can highlight a positive correlation of gGI 
values with Tobin Q in static analysis. For this reason, 
we can observe that the Tobin Q is the only parameter 
that manages to capture a relationship. The “well-
advised” firms in external strategies are able to obtain 
a better correlation with performance and a less 
probability of default (Z-score). 
Observing the aforementioned relationships for 
the identified subsamples, we can find that a greater 
acquisition activity
8
 is correlated with a lower 
probability of failure (Z-score) and with a positive 
sign of CAR. Among the other results, which will be 
discussed later, we mention that the non-family firms, 
that present a better gGI, show a lower probability of 
default. 
                                                          
8 It is important to underline that the more active in 
corporate acquisition companies feel the need to draw up a 
Code of Ethics. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a 
definition of a theoretical framework, we illustrate our 
research hypotheses. Then, we describe the data 
collection process, the variables used in the empirical 
analysis and the statistical methodology. In the last 
parts, we discuss our findings and the limitations of 
our study. Again, we highlight that this work is a first 
step in the overall research, a work in progress: the 
study, in fact, is proceeding with an expansion of the 
sample, introducing a benchmark with the companies 
of other countries. 
 
2 Literature and research hypotheses 
 
The quality of Corporate Governance models, 
imposed by a legal system or Auto Disciplinary Code, 
may be important for the proper functioning of the 
economic system (Roe, 2004). Some studies confirm 
that improvements in corporate governance practices 
and rules, as the awareness and active involvement of 
all components of the business community (Brown 
and Caylor, 2006), can increase the economic 
efficiency (World Bank, 2001). In the context of the 
different Corporate Governance definition, we 
mention the interpretation elaborated by Baghat et al. 
(2010: p. 1806) that put the rules of good governance 
first as an investment and therefore the importance of 
the measurement of its effects: “Corporate 
governance is the set of processes that provides an 
assurance to outside investors of a fair return of their 
investment”.  
Performance, accountability and supervision are 
interdependent dimensions: managers and Boards of 
Directors – being “measured” continuously for the 
results obtained by the company under their guidance 
– should improve their performance, helping the 
business to grow. There has been renewed interest in 
the Corporate Governance practices of modern 
corporations, particularly in relation to accountability, 
since the high-profile collapse of a number of large 
corporations during 2001-2002, most of which 
involved accounting fraud. In fact, many corporate 
crises were caused by deficiencies, or even the 
absence, of controls: the importance given to 
Corporate Governance issues by the owners and the 
managers, as well as by the market and the legislator, 
have grown considerably (Baghat and Bolton, 2008; 
Barontini and Caprio, 2006). In recent years the 
Corporate Governance issues are focusing on interest 
of scholars and practitioners, stimulating a cross-
culture discussion, investing finance scholars, 
economists and jurists. A search for “Corporate 
Governance” found a lot of titles, that analyzed the 
different matters, but one of the most important issue 
is the need to “measure”  the quality of firm’s 
Corporate Governance and the effects that a good 
practice may have on performance and on the level of 
risk, especially on the default risk. In literature, there 
have been innumerable studies examining the 
Corporate Governance best practices (Black, 1999; 
Lipman and Lipman, 2006; Tarantino, 2008; Zaffron 
and Logan, 2009) and the impact on performance, 
using several parameters. The issue of measurement 
of Corporate Governance is still very delicate and 
discussed (Romano, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002). 
In fact, it is a matter of great importance for 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 10, Issue 4, 2013, Continued - 5 
 
 512 
academics and for investors. There is still not today a 
unique universally adopted methodology and a unique 
meaning of Corporate Governance (Bhagat et al., 
2008; Colarossi et al., 2008). The studies of Gompers 
et al. (2003) have opened a new thread pointing to the 
creation of firm level Corporate governance indexes 
(G-Index), that can concentrate the contribution of 
different drivers of the Corporate Governance quality. 
The use of an index, as an aggregated measure of 
Corporate Governance quality, allows scholars and 
professionals to enjoy a significant advantage, 
because they can relate the Corporate Governance 
with companies’ performance indicators. After these 
studies there have been other contributions that have 
banked some simplification (Cremers and Viany, 
2005; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Brown and Caylor, 2006) 
or to consider the country policy regulation (Bubbico 
et al., 2012) (Tab. 1). 
 
 
Table 1. Most important Corporate Governance Indexes in literature 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEXES AUTHORS 
NUMBER OF 
DRIVERS 
Governance Index (G) Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003 24 
Alternative Takeover Protection Index (ATI) Cremers and Vinay, 2005 3 
Gov-Score Index and Gov 7 Brown and Caylor, 2006 51 and 7 
Entrenchment index (E) and  Other Provision 
Index 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrel, 2009 6 and 18 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI)  Bubbico, Giorgino and Monda, 2012 76 
 
These indexes are similar but different at the 
same time, both in terms of number and of kind of 
included drivers. It is obvious that considering a wide 
range of factors a more indicative index and a more 
accurate firm’s Governance measurement can be 
produced. On the other hand, it is also true, however, 
that adopting a more limited number of provisions 
makes the index far more practical, easier and faster 
to find all the information necessary for its 
construction. It will focus more attention on those 
few, but more reliable and relevant. 
For this reason, in this work a Corporate 
Governance index (good Governance Index-gGI) was 
built and tested, adjusted to Italian enterprises, 
considering the peculiarities of the national context. 
The main cognitive goal is to evaluate the minority 
protection, as well as the level of openness towards 
investors, especially private equity funds, that have 
become an important partner for financial support to 
enterprises’ strategies. Private equity funds can 
produce significant advantages for businesses, 
including credibility, improvement of rating, higher 
visibility and increasing corporate communications, 
better access to community and international 
contributions: in essence, they stimulate a well-
structured governance (AIFI, 2013).  
Another factor of interest is the study of the 
relation between the level of good governance with 
the performance and the financial risk. In academic 
empirical studies of the relationship between 
Corporate Governance and performance we can 
identify two research fields. In the first case, the 
analysis is centered in the study of Governance 
effects, such as unitary complex of choices of 
Government, for the creation of business value. The 
second group of studies, on the other hand, focused on 
the drivers of Corporate Governance (specifically the 
Ownership structure, the Size, Composition and 
Turnover of the Board of Directors and the Control 
System) and the performance (Romano, 1996; Baghat 
and Black, 2002). Despite widespread belief in the 
importance of governance mechanisms for resolving 
agency problems (Jensen, 1988), the empirical 
literature, investigating the effect on corporate 
performance, has not been able to identify a unique 
effect. Although Gompers et al. (2010), Brown and 
Caylor (2006) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) found a 
positive associations between their indexes’ rankings 
of governance quality and firm performance, 
correlations are obviously not causation. Subsequent 
works have even questioned whether a positive 
association truly exists (Cremers and Nair, 2006; 
Lehn et al., 2006; Core et al., 2006). 
In addition to these studies, we considered 
further research that has occupied the theme of the 
relationship between good Governance practices and 
corporate performance. 
A first example was a survey (McKinsey, 2000 
and 2002) highlighting that about 80% of investors 
would be willing to pay a premium for well governed 
companies, with a majority of external, independent 
advisors. The amount of the premium, according to 
the survey, should be a minimum of 11% for 
Canadian companies, to a maximum of 40% for those 
companies operating in countries with a less strong 
State regulation. 
Other studies have also found a link between the 
quality perception of the company and the stock 
returns. For example, in research on consolidated 
profit in five years, led by the American Magazine 
Fortune, it was shown that in “much admired” 
companies presented a consolidated profit of shares in 
five years equal to 125%, compared to the 80% of 
those “less experience”. 
In an economic situation in which there is a 
“struggle for existence” (Lee and Yeh, 2004; Hui and 
Jing-Jing, 2008) a strong debate began about the 
relationship between Corporate Governance and 
default risk. Among the many reasons that led a 
company to a crisis, a large literature highlighted the 
ineffective and inefficient management and control 
systems: the problems related to Corporate 
Governance as a bad “governum” (Mumford, 2003; 
Wright et al., 2002). The seriousness of the causes of 
decline is expressed by poor economic performance 
and often resulting in loss of value for the companies. 
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The outlook of the company is not favorable and the 
degree of risk is ever increasing (Mariani and Panaro, 
2012). More attention has been given to the study of 
systems and instruments that can be adopted in the 
prevention, diagnosis of corporate crisis (Lappalainen 
and Niskanen, 2009). In literature on corporate 
finance there are numerous works on problem 
analysis and forecasting crisis (Altman, 1977, 2000, 
2002; Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006; Beaver, 1966 and 
1968; D’Annunzio and Falavigna, 2004; Friedman, 
1977; Hui and Jing-Jing, 2008; Lee and Yeh, 2004; 
Mumford, 2003).  
In this framework, we considered relevant to 
verify the existence of a relationship between the 
quality of corporate governance system – defining a 
Corporate Governance Index – and the corporate 
performances e the default risk (Altman, 2000; Platt 
and Platt, 2002). For this purpose has been formulated 
and tested the following research hypothesis:  
H1: There is a relationship between the quality 
of Corporate Governance and performance and 
default risk. 
A more in-depth analysis of the relationship 
above hypothesized, requires the identification of the 
different Corporate Governance drivers influence on 
performance and risk. In accordance with Agency 
Theory, we can highlight that a widespread share 
ownership could determine a reduction of 
involvement or even the difficulty for the owner to 
exercise effective control over the management 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Studies in this area 
have shown, albeit with obvious simplifications and 
limits, a positive trend in support of the theory of the 
agency costs, highlighting how the presence of an 
active shareholder reduces the tendency of managers 
to pursue private interests and to promote value 
creation. Yet, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found a 
significant positive relationship between performance 
and ownership. The decisive balance of studies found 
none between Directors independence and 
performance, shown by accounting parameters or 
stock return measures (Romano, 1996; Bhagat et al., 
1999). In this sense, therefore, it would seem useful in 
terms of Good Governance to take an ownership 
structure that requires a principal owner and not an 
overly fragmented one (La Porta et al., 2000). 
The relationship between voting rights and 
performance has not been as extensively studied as 
that of board composition. Not surprisingly, some 
studies showed that voting rights are economically 
quite valuable (Gompers et al., 2010; Zingales, 1994). 
Other researches (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) 
investigated the correlation between the size of the 
Board and the corporate performance, and not all had 
the same empirical results. In fact, there are studies 
claiming that the increasing of the numbers of 
members can determine new strategic opportunities, 
with advantages in terms of performance. Other 
studies showed that the benefits emerging from an 
increasing size of the Board produces lower costs due 
to major decision-making and organizational 
complexity of Corporate Governance (Lipton and 
Lorsh, 1992). 
Further studies, concerning the relationship 
between the components of the Board of Directors 
turnover and business performance, went on to 
analyze the optimum composition of it in relation to 
the number and the impact of the independent 
Directors in terms of value creation (Li and Harrison, 
2008; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Mork, 1988). 
Ample space is also occupied by studies and 
research relating to the issue of internal controls. The 
presence of an effective control system facilitates the 
convergence of different interests within the 
company. According to these studies, there is a 
positive correlation between higher level of 
independence and technical expertise of internal 
control bodies and value creation (Chan and Li, 
2008). The studies of Bennedsen et al. (2009) provide 
direct evidence that CEO actions can have a 
meaningful impact on performance. In order to 
deepen the cited debate, we can define the second 
research hypothesis: 
H2: There is a relation between the Corporate 
Governance quality drivers and performance and 
default risk. 
Although in several countries, the most common 
large shareholder are families (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), it should be noted 
that in Italy the presence of family businesses has 
spread in a more marked way than in other countries 
(Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Gnan and Songini, 2003; 
Gnan and Montemerlo, 2008). In recent years, the 
studies on this topic have multiplied, more often 
supported by empirical analysis, to deepen the 
“definition dilemma” (Rutherford et al., 2008; 
European Commission, 2009; Toma and Montanari, 
2010) and the impact that the family role could 
express on performance and on corporate governance 
quality (Litz, 1997; Miller et al., 2007; Chrisman et 
al., 2010; Sharma, 2011; Pearson and Lumpkin, 
2011). The first crucial question is what a family 
business is. The “definition dilemma” is somewhat 
debated and still able to produce controversy. As it is 
well known, it is not possible to find an unambiguous 
and generally shared definition of family business. 
Being a family firm depends on different aspects. 
Some studies define a firm as a family business 
considering the sole extent of interest owned by the 
family (Donckels and Frohlich, 1991). In a 
progressive evolution scholars have additionally 
considered the presence of family members also in 
management (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Babicky, 
1987; Chrisma et al., 2004; Churchill and Hatten, 
1987; Davis, 2007; Dreux, 1990; Donnelley 1964; 
Handler 1990; Holland and Boulton 1984; Holland 
and Oliver 1992; Lyman, 1991; Litz, 1995; Pratt and 
Davis, 1986). The development of a synthetic 
indicator capable of representing the degree of family 
involvement in the firm is a possible solution to 
understand the different aspects (Astrachan et al., 
2002, Klein et al., 2005). The importance of family 
business has sparked a growing body of studies that 
focuses on the governance of these companies. Aside 
from defining problems, we must emphasis that 
family firms are unique because the corporate 
governance is largely determined by family control. 
In fact, in terms of governance, ownership 
concentration may alleviate the agency problems from 
dispersed shareholdings (Miller et al., 2010). The 
challenge is that families may steer firms towards 
decisions that favor them at the expense of minority 
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shareholders (Becht et al., 2003). The family 
organization can play a crucial role in decision 
making. At the most general level, family governance 
determines the type of interactions between the family 
and the firms (such as Ownership, Board of Directors, 
and Management). Bennedsen et al. (2007) provide 
stark evidence that the characteristics of the family 
behind the firm can affect succession decisions and 
performance. The existing literature provides few 
clues into the specific ways in which family firms use 
their characteristics or structure to affect value 
(Caprio et al., 2011). Direct tests on the effect of 
governance in family firms are rare in literature and it 
can be an attractive area of research for the future. In 
this discussion we can analyze the third research 
hypothesis. 
H3: The relation between Corporate 
Governance quality drivers and performance and 
default risk is different for family and non-family 
firms. 
As previously noted, the corporate governance 
quality can influence the company strategies and 
M&A activity is a fundamental strategy for growth, 
for value creation and sometimes for the enterprise 
survival (Bigelli and Mengoli, 1999;  DePamphilis, 
2012; Healy et al., 1992; Heron and Lie, 2002; Teece 
et al., 1997;). In fact, many multinational companies 
today are the result of M&A between two or more 
companies (Arnold, 2013). The high incidence and 
volume of mergers and acquisitions highlights their 
importance to the economic context of the firms 
operating in different countries. The literature on 
M&A is extensive. Several studies argue also that 
corporate acquisition is one of the mechanisms by 
which companies gain access to new resources 
through redeployment, increase revenues, efficiency 
and cost reduction. The realization of M&As, as 
known, promotes the achievement of market, 
operating and financial synergies (Sirower, 1997; 
Sirower and Sahni, 2006) by combining the resources 
of the two merging companies. Another kind of 
synergy discussed in the academic literature results 
from the improvement of the target firms’ corporate 
governance. A hostile acquisition can be considered 
an important corporate mechanism to correct 
opportunistic managerial behavior. However, a “good 
governum” can influence the success of these 
operations. In fact, M&A activity is sometimes 
mentioned as the outgrowth of corporate governance 
failure. This is because numerous empirical studies 
showed that a substantial proportion of M&As destroy 
corporate value. The failure of an acquisition (Kalpic, 
2008; Marafioti, 2005) is, in most cases, attributable 
to the managerial inability and lack of a strategic 
management. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) 
cited agency problems between management and 
shareholders as the main driver of such value 
destroying acquisitions. Self-interested managers may 
engage in M&A activity to achieve their personal 
objectives, such as “building an empire”, at the 
expense of shareholders value (Jensen, 2005). So the 
fourth research hypothesis: 
H4: The relation between Corporate 
Governance quality drivers and performance and 
default risk may be different for companies with a 
higher or a lower propensity to M&A activity. 
Since some transactions may result in value 
destruction if there is a conflict of interest between 
management and shareholders of the bidders, we can 
argue that the Corporate Governance quality is a 
crucial issue for institutional shareholders that are 
determined to finance M&As and to complete 
restructuring operations. Institutional shareholders 
generally agree on the core principles of corporate 
governance and what might be deemed to be good 
governance. The level of balance between the rights 
of shareholders and managers and the opening degree 
of management and control structures are important 
for institutional investors, who would be willing to 
recognize a premium for well governed companies 
(Mc Kinsey, 2002): in essence “the need of openness” 
(Gubitta and Gianecchini, 2011).  
 
3 Methodology 
 
3.1 Data collection  
 
The analysis is based on the evidence stemming from 
a sample of the Milan Stock Exchange listed 
companies. The sample includes all the companies 
which were listed in each year from 2005 to 2011 and 
which realized at least one acquisition in the period, 
excluding pure financial companies and real estate 
services  (Giovannini, 2010;  Sraer and Tesmar, 2006; 
Favero et al., 2006). The sample dimension is of 98 
units.  
It was necessary to merge several data sources in 
order to build an exhaustive database to analysed 
different aspects:  
1) to provide measures on the number of 
mergers and acquisitions operations; 
2) to calculate performance indicators; 
3) to identify family businesses; 
4) to measure the market value of the company; 
5) to assess the financial risk of the company.  
Accounting data was drawn from the Financial 
Statements of the companies, the DataStreem and 
AIDA databases and from the companies’ web-sites. 
Information about corporate acquisition activity was 
taken from the Zephyr files. The Borsa Italiana and 
YahooFinance website provided data on the 
companies’ share prices and Corporate Governance 
Relations. Gathering data on “familiness” was 
particularly demanding. Most of information was 
drawn from the companies’ corporate governance 
reports and from the Consob files. In some cases, it 
was necessary to consult the company’s web-site 
and/or journalistic data sources.  
 
3.2 Variables description 
 
We describe, below, the other variables used for the 
empirical analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Familiness 
 
In this paper, we distinguished the family firms from 
other companies, using variables well-suited to 
expose the characteristics of the Italian economic 
context and unambiguous in their definition 
(Astrachan et al., 2002). First, we introduced a 
criterion regarding ownership and management at the 
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same time, i.e. a dichotomous variable “familiness” 
(equal to 1 in the case of family businesses, 0 
otherwise). According to this interpretation, the 
following were considered family businesses (see 
table 2): 
 Companies where family members own a 
majority interest equal to at least 50% + 1 of the 
equity capital (family presence in the property). 
 Companies where at least one member of the 
family (major owner) holds a business interest not 
smaller than 20% (Klasa, 2007: p. 346) and at least 
one member of the family is part of the Board of 
Directors (family presence in ownership and in 
administration). 
The criterion “family presence in the property” 
includes in the group of family businesses all 
companies in which control is permanently held by 
the family (regardless of the fact that there are family 
members in the Board of Directors), for which there is 
no possibility of involuntary loss of control rights as a 
result of passive takeovers. The choice of a high 
threshold (absolute control) of the share capital is 
based on the characteristics of Italian companies. The 
Italian context, is characterized by companies with 
more concentrated ownership with respect to the 
Anglo-Saxon benchmark, especially in the case of 
family businesses (Favero et al., 2006; Granata and 
Chirico, 2010). 
The second condition (family presence in 
ownership and in administration) is designed to 
include, in the sample of family companies, firms that 
are not completely controlled by the family capital. So 
we considered the presence of family members both 
as shareholders and as directors. In other words, if the 
family does not have absolute control, the family 
presence is required on the Board of Directors too. 
The aforementioned condition is also in line with 
Corbetta and Tommaselli (1996) and with Klein 
(2000). These authors stress that family participation 
in business can be inferred from the family control of 
the capital or, if the controlling stake is not held by 
the family, from the degree of influence of family 
members on the management. 
  
 
Table 2. Family business identification criteria 
 
  Ownership 
  family member = 0 family member = 1 family member > 1 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
family member = 0 Non family Non family Family** 
family member = 1 Non family Family* Family* 
family member > 1 Non family Family* Family* 
* if family stake is > 20%, ** if family stake is > 50% 
 
3.2.2 Corporate governance index 
 
The purpose of Good Governance Index (gGI) is to 
identify the level of openness to new shareholders and 
to measure the degree of protection to minority 
shareholders. We introduced the different elements of 
Governance that could contribute to this aim (tab. 3).  
 
Each of these Corporate Governance variables, 
except those relating to the existence of shareholders’ 
agreements and Auto Disciplinary Code, serves as a 
dummy variable — we can assign to it a value of 0 or 
1. Since the purpose of the indicator of “good 
governance”, as anticipated (to measure the degree of 
protection of minority shareholders and the company's 
opening level at the entrance of new members), 
assigning values to these variables follows this simple 
and logical policy: we will assign the value 1 to the 
variable object of analysis if it reflects a greater 
degree of openness to new members or input of 
greater protection of minorities. While, we assign the 
value 0 in the opposite case. With regard to 
shareholders, it was decided to assign the values 0 or 
1, -1, while for the adhesion to the Auto Disciplinary 
Code has opted for assigning values 0, 1 or 2. 
 
3.2.3 Performance 
 
In order to assess the relationship between the quality 
of the corporate governance system and the 
performance, we considered two different 
performance indicators referred to the economic and 
financial status of the companies and to their market 
prices, as described below: 
 ROI (Return On Investment) as accounting 
performance variables; 
 CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Returns) used 
as market performance indicator (Masulis et al., 
2007), obtained, on an annual basis, as the sum of 
monthly returns of stock prices compared with the 
FTSE-All Share Italy:  
  
 
 
 Tobin-Q is the ratio of the market value to 
book value and it is calculated as follows: (total assets 
– equity book value + equity market value)/total 
assets. Where equity market value is represented by 
market cap. 
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Table 3. The Good Governance Index (gGI) 
 
Corporate Governance Variables SCORE 
Administration Model  
 Traditional 1 
one-tier system 0 
two-tier system 0 
Auto Disciplinary Code 0 if not present 
1 if partially present  
2 if present 
Code of ethics 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Non-executive directors 1 independent; 0 dependent 
Executive directors 1 no family member; 0 family member 
Board of directors 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Board audit committees 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Compensation committees 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Nomination Committee 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Stockholders' agreement 0 if not present; 
 1 if for minority protection; 
 -1 if for majority favor 
Minority expressed Directors 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Corporate Agreement or veto of Private Equity  1 if present; 0 if not present 
Private Equity Directors 1 if present; 0 if not present 
Nonvoting Stock 0 if present; 1 if not present 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 1 external; 0 family member 
 
3.2.4 Financial risk 
 
We focused also on the company’s risk profile. In this 
analysis, were considered indicators of financial risk 
represented below: 
 Leverage (Debt/Equity) as financial risk 
indicator; 
 Z-Score as default risk indicator. The Z-
Score model consists in a linear analysis in that five 
measures are objectively weighted and summed up to 
define an overall score that represents the basis for 
measuring the risk of bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). We 
decided to use a revised version of Z-Score to 
represent the characteristics of Italian companies 
better (Bottani et al., 2004): Z-Score = 
(1,981*Working Capital/Assets) + (9,841*Retained 
Earnings/Assets) + (1,951*ROI) + 
(3,206*Equity/Assets) + (4,037*Return On Sales). 
The operating nature of the components described 
above, make the Z-Score more capable than other 
indicators to explain the risk linked to the operational 
aspect of the business. 
 M&A: number of active operations 
concluded.  
 
3.3 Statistical analyses and results  
 
The aim of our analysis is to understand if and how 
corporate governance features can influence the 
performance and the risk of Italian listed companies. 
To do so, we collected a sample of 98 companies 
listed on the Italian Stock Exchange Market since 
2005 to 2011, that had an active role in corporate 
acquisitions. For each of them we collected 
information about corporate governance features, 
performance, risk and other data that we used to 
cluster the sample. Being aware of limitations due to 
this choice, we used a simple least square approach, in 
order to preserve easy and immediate understanding 
of results. First of all, we tried to build a synthetic 
index able to reflect corporate governance quality for 
each company. We listed 15 corporate governance 
features and built a matrix Amxn (m = 98 is the number 
of companies and n = 15 is the number of corporate 
governance features considered). Each element of A, 
that is Aij, is equal to 1, if company i has corporate 
governance feature j, otherwise if not present 0. The 
synthetic index of corporate governance is simply 
given by the row-wise sum of the matrix A. In the 
following Fig. 1 we displayed the distribution of gGI, 
that, as we can easily check, seems to be Gaussian. 
gGi index has a mean of 9.16 and a standard deviation 
of 1.72; the mode is 10 whereas the median is 9. 
In order to discover if different corporate 
governance frameworks are responsible for different 
company performance and risk, we regressed 
companies performance indexes (ROI, CAR and 
Tobin Q) and companies risk indexes (Z-Score and 
leverage) versus our synthetic index gGI. We carried 
out two types of analysis: statical and dynamical. In 
the first one, we regressed the value of performance 
and risk indexes concerning the 2011 versus the gGI. 
In the latter, we analysed the correlation of the trend 
of performance and risk indexes of the last 6 years 
versus gGI. The static analysis highlighted a lower 
correlation (tabb. 4-5). 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Good Governance Index (gGI) 
 
 
 
Table 4. Relation between Corporate Governance Index (cGI) and Performance. Static regression results 
 
ROI vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 0,0254417 0,0460528 0,5823 
gGI −0,00423439 0,00494937 0,3950 
Tobin Q vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 0,258493 0,143490 0,0758  * 
gGI 0,0313410 0,0154371 0,0460  ** 
 
Table 5. Relation between Corporate Governance Index (cGI) and Risk. Static regression results 
 
Leverage vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 1,21931 0,877316 0,1688 
gGI 0,00937297 0,0943842 0,9212 
CAR vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. -6,30081 7,24143 0,3864 
gGI 0,541032 0,776819 0,4878 
 
As we can see, only in the regression versus 
Tobin Q, gGI Beta is significantly different from 0 
and shows a positive correlation between Tobin Q and 
gGI. Dynamical analysis shows insignificant 
correlations between performance/Risk indexes and 
gGI. We omit the results for brevity. The poor 
explaining power of our model can be due to the 
strong heterogeneity of the sample. To avoid this 
problem we clustered the sample using some a priori 
knowledge. More precisely, we separate companies 
whose number of merging and acquisition activities is 
under the mean from companies very active in M&As 
and family from non-family business (Fig. 2). 
Considering the number of M&A procedures, 
companies who are above the mean are 29, with an 
average gGI of 9.41 and gGI standard deviation of 
1.59. Companies who did a number of M&A 
procedures smaller that the mean are 69 and have an 
average gGI of 9.05 and a standard deviation of 1.77. 
Non-family business sub sample is composed of  
50 companies with an average gGI of 9.78 and gGI 
standard deviation of 1.89; 48 companies composing 
of family business sub sample have an average gGI of 
8.34 and gGI standard deviation of  1.72. 
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Figure 2. Value of gGI for different subsamples 
 
 
In the following we show only significant results 
for the four subsamples. 
 
Table 6. Relation between Corporate Governance Index (cGI) and Performance 
 in companies more active in M&A 
 
CAR vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 0,373989 0,222303 0,1040 
gGI −0,0435213 0,0232948 0,0726  * 
 
Table 7. Relation between Corporate Governance Index (cGI) and Performance 
 in companies less active in M&A 
 
Tobin Q vs. gGI Beta Standard Error P-value 
Const. 0,201879 0,182826 0,2747 
gGI 0,0371954 0,0197842 0,0658  * 
 
As we can see, correlation between gGI and 
Tobin Q seems confirmed for companies who made 
fewer M&As, whereas, for the more active companies 
this correlation disappears, it is replaced by a small 
negative correlation between CAR and gGI.  
Family/Non-family subs samples do not show 
significant results. 
To understand better which Corporate 
Governance component influences performances and 
risk, we regressed each single component of gGI 
versus both static and dynamical performance and risk 
indexes. We carried out the analysis for the whole 
sample and for four sub samples as before: high 
M&A/low M&A and Family/Non-family business. 
We summarized significant results in table 8. 
 
 
Table 8. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index (cGI)  and Performance in the whole 
sample (Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance drivers Beta Standard Error P-Value 
Tobin Q Shareholders' agreements 0,120926 0,0558514 0,0336** 
Z Score Executive directors 18,0959 9,69341 0,0659* 
CAR Board audit committees 8,14818 3,53234 0,0232** 
Delta Tobin Q Non-executive directors −6,86202 3,55479 0,0565* 
Delta Z Score Shareholders' agreements 3,85124 1,87267 0,0425** 
Delta CAR Code of ethics −0,281618 0,0969400 0,0046*** 
 
Results for the whole sample show that six 
corporate governance drivers seem to affect 
performance\risk indexes, two of which with a 
negative beta (Non-executive directors, Code of 
ethics). It is interesting to highlight that same 
dependent variables are affected by different 
corporate governance drivers if we consider static or 
dynamic variables. 
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Table 9. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in family business 
(Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance driver Beta Standard Error P-Value 
ROI Executive directors −0,0559147 0,0250111 0,0310** 
Tobin Q Auto Disciplinary Code 0,115830 0,0598827 0,0602* 
Tobin Q Non-executive directors 0,133420 0,0713513 0,0688* 
Z Score Board audit committees −9,22987 2,38871 0,0004*** 
Z Score Non-executive directors 5,26496 2,35149 0,0308** 
Delta CAR Code of ethics −0,196581 0,116047 0,0970* 
Delta CAR Traditional System −0,957447 0,294817 0,0022*** 
 
Subsample composed by family business 
companies shows seven significant correlations, four 
of which with negative beta. Differently from the 
whole sample ROI seems to be affected, negatively, 
by the presence of executive directors (tab. 9). 
 
 
Table 10. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in non-family 
business (Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance driver Beta Standard Error P-Value 
Tobin Q Board audit committees 0,546132 0,295181 0,0738* 
Tobin Q Non-executive directors −0,197454 0,103201 0,0650* 
Leverage Nonvoting Stock 1,22048 0,680538 0,0827* 
CAR Board audit committees 10,9823 5,94454 0,0708* 
Delta CAR Code of ethics 0,0251763 0,0104901 0,0203** 
Delta Z Score Shareholders' agreements 2,92516 1,05114 0,0077*** 
 
Non-family business companies sub sample 
shows six significant correlations, one of which with 
negative beta. Considering this sub sample, ROI 
seems not to be affected by a corporate governance 
driver (tab. 10). 
 
Table 11. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in more active in 
M&A companies  (Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance driver Beta Standard Error P-Value 
ROI Auto Disciplinary Code 0,0754722 0,0354757 0,0460** 
Tobin Q Nonvoting Stock 0,135082 0,0703351 0,0692* 
Tobin Q Non-executive directors −0,173214 0,0709145 0,0240** 
Z Score Auto Disciplinary Code 9,31618 3,85258 0,0253** 
Z Score Code of ethics 7,82869 4,01466 0,0653* 
Leverage Minority  espressed Directors 1,08297 0,563582 0,0690* 
Leverage Nonvoting Stock 1,09867 0,526613 0,0500** 
CAR Board audit committees −0,179935 0,0794669 0,0318** 
Delta ROI Shareholders' agreements 3,43056 1,48887 0,0291** 
Delta ROI Nonvoting Stock −3,34444 1,66399 0,0545* 
Delta ROI Board audit committees 4,44928 1,84898 0,0232** 
Delta Tobin Q Code of ethics 3,75000 2,07814 0,0823* 
Delta Tobin Q Board audit committees 4,07246 1,89579  0,0408** 
Delta Tobin Q Non-executive directors −3,25325 1,83822 0,0881* 
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Table 11. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in more active in 
M&A companies  (Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) - continued 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance driver Beta Standard Error P-Value 
Delta Tobin Q Nonvoting Stock −3,39444 1,67320 0,0525* 
Delta Z Score Code of ethics 3,25000 1,88386 0,0959* 
Delta Leverage Executive directors −1,76842 0,885866 0,0561* 
Delta CAR Shareholders' agreements 0,0233113 0,0132149 0,0890* 
Delta CAR Code of ethics 0,0402820 0,0170433 0,0256** 
 
Sub samples composed of  active companies in 
merging and acquisition activity seems to be the most 
affected by corporate governance drivers showing 
nineteen significant correlations, six of which with a 
negative beta. It is interesting to highlight as same 
corporate governance drivers (e.g. presence of Auto 
Disciplinary Code) have effects on different 
performance\risk indexes (tab. 11). 
 
Table 12. Relation between different drivers of Corporate Governance Index and Performance in less active in 
M&A companies (Delta before index name indicates the trend of the index in last six years) 
 
Parameters Corporate Governance driver Beta Standard Error P-Value 
Tobin Q Shareholders' agreements 0,151405 0,0718986 0,0402** 
Tobin Q Code of ethics 0,162469 0,0868637 0,0672* 
Z Score Non-executive directors 25,0033 13,8506 0,0769* 
Leverage Non-executive directors 0,857166 0,458856 0,0675 * 
CAR Board audit committees 16,4651 5,57805 0,0044*** 
Delta Tobin Q Code of ethics −6,43421 3,82473 0,0972* 
Delta Z Score Shareholders' agreements 2,72052 1,33850 0,0461** 
Delta CAR Traditional System −0,470149 0,184731 0,0132** 
Delta CAR Code of ethics −0,149123 0,0836652 0,0792* 
Delta CAR Board audit committees −0,303030 0,154782      0,0544* 
 
The Last sub sample considered, is composed of 
companies who did few merging and acquisition 
procedures, showing ten significant correlations, four 
of which with a negative beta. The parameter that 
seems to be more affected by corporate governance 
drivers is delta CAR that is negatively correlated to 
three different corporate governance drivers 
Traditional System, Code of ethics, Board audit 
committees). 
 
4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper is a first step in our work in progress. In 
fact, we aim to introduce a deeper analysis to test the 
gGI on other samples and in companies of other 
countries. In this direction, we can refine the 
Corporate Governance Index and test on other 
situations, such as Polish listed companies, that we 
are studying.  
Our first results, however, could enlighten some 
interesting constructs. 
Regarding the gGI we can observe that it can 
assume value between 4-13 and it presents an average 
value of 9.1 for the whole sample. Our companies 
could improve their Corporate Governance quality, 
especially in the sub sample of family businesses that 
detect a lower value (8.5), although in the index there 
are drivers that specifically regard family firms 
(Executive Independent, CEO).  
Moreover, we should point out that the non-
family companies are better structured (9.8), 
demonstrating a greater minority protection and good 
opening to the outside. 
The Corporate Governance quality presents 
some correlation with performance and risk 
parameters (Switzer and Wang, 2013). We can 
highlight a positive correlation of gGI values with 
Tobin Q (tab. 4), observed in a static analysis. For this 
reason we can observe that the Tobin Q is the only 
parameter able to capture a relationship, confirming 
its usefulness to detect market performance, as shown 
in literature (Gompers et al., 2003).  
Looking at the sub-samples, only the companies 
less active in M&A present a positive correlation 
between a “good governum” and Tobin Q; while the 
more active firms have a negative relation with the 
performance, expressed by CAR. We can observe that 
the “well-advised” firms in external strategies are able 
to obtain a better correlation with performance. 
Concerning the different contribution of 
Corporate Governance drivers, we can observe that 
Shareholders’ Agreements and Board Audit 
Committee have an important correlation on 
performance. Shareholders’ Agreements present a 
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positive relation on market performance (Tobin Q and 
CAR) for the whole sample (tab. 8) and for less active 
companies (Tobin Q-tab 12). Also on risk parameters 
Shareholders’ Agreements show a correlation for the 
whole sample, for the companies less active in M&A 
and for non-family firms (tab. 10). We can observe 
that for these companies a better Corporate 
Governance is correlated with a lower probability of 
default. We can highlight that Shareholders’ 
Agreements may represent an important minority 
instrument. The results show that the aforementioned 
agreements are more present especially in non-family 
companies, according to the part of literature that 
outlined that in more concentrated ownership the 
minority protection is lower (La Porta et al., 2000). 
The variable “Non Executive Directors” presents 
a negative sign for the whole sample and for the non-
family companies; it shows a good relation with 
Tobin Q for family firms in which Independent non 
executive directors are more present, demonstrating a 
particular attention to this important driver of 
Corporate Governance quality. Also on risk 
parameters the family businesses (tab. 9 present a 
positive relation with cGI level and Z-score, while 
less active in M&A companies show a positive 
relation with Z-score and leverage (tab. 12). 
The companies, in which the Non Executive 
Directors are more present, demonstrate a greater 
openness to external subjects, with important 
management activities (Overhue and Cotter, 2010). 
On the whole sample it is the Executive 
Directors presence that produces a very positive 
correlation with Z-score (tab. 8). Another important 
aspect is the role of the Code of Ethics, that explains 
the attention of the companies to stakeholders 
interests (in the broadest sense).  
We can find that the more active companies in 
corporate acquisitions feel the need to draw up a Code 
of Ethics. The presence of the aforementioned Code is 
correlated with a lower probability of failure (Z-score) 
and with a positive sign for CAR. We can observe 
that a Code of Ethics can produce an improving in 
reputation, especially if we consider the investors and 
the other stakeholders (i.e.: Unions, employers), more 
important for the success of M&A operations. In fact, 
the Code of Ethics has become a tool for ensuring fair 
and efficient management of transactions and human 
relations, supporting the reputation of the enterprise, 
in order to create confidence. Creating a Code of 
Ethics can prove the good faith of the company, in 
cases of dispute, reducing the sanctions (Jensen, 
2002). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), our 
analysis highlights that the non-family firms present a 
better gGI, showing a lower probability of default. 
The classification adopted in this work for the 
identification of family businesses shows the presence 
of CEO “familiar” and family members on the board. 
In this connection, we can see that the presence of 
external managers, a future of non families sub 
sample, may guarantee a higher professionalization 
(Stewart and Hitt, 2012; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008), 
with positive effects on performance and less risk of 
critical situations, especially in financial stability and 
working capital management. 
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